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Abstract In this paper we analyze the economic effects of implementing EPA’s newly proposed regulations
for carbon dioxide (CO2) on existing U.S. coal-fired power plants using nonparametric methods on a sample
of 144 electricity generating units. Moreover, we develop an approach for evaluating the economic gains from
averaging emission intensities among the utilities’ generating units, compared to implementing unit-specific
performance standards. Our results show that the implementation of flexible standards leads to up to 2.7
billion dollars larger profits compared to the uniform standards. Moreover, we find that by adopting best
practices, current profits can be maintained even if an intensity standard of 0.88 tons of CO2 per MWh is
implemented. However, our results also indicate a trade-off between environmental and profit gains, since
aggregate CO2 emissions are higher with emission intensity averaging than with uniform standards.
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1 Introduction
In the summer of 2013, President Obama asked the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to design
carbon dioxide (CO2) regulations for new and existing power plants. In response to the President’s request,
the EPA proposed a new rule on June 18th, 2014, under the authority of the Clean Air Act (CAA).1
According to the EPA’s projections, the new rule would by 2030 reduce the power sector’s CO2 emissions
by 30 percent relative to 2005-levels.
In their proposal, the EPA calculates CO2 performance standards for each state, depending on their power
sectors’ perceived capabilities to reduce CO2 emissions. The standards are determined based on a number of
variables, including existing strategies to improve the efficiency of fossil-fuel power plants, existing programs
to spur investments in low-emitting energy, demand-side energy savings programs, and the states’ current
fuel mixes.
While the state-level CO2 performance standards are specific, the EPA does not direct measures which the
states should implement to reach their emission targets. Instead, each state or a collaboration of states must
develop plans on how they will achieve the EPA standards. The states must establish emission performance
levels for affected electricity generating units that are equivalent to the state-specific CO2 performance
standards proposed by the EPA. These performance levels could be in the form of the performance standards
set by the EPA, or the state-specific performance standards could be translated into mass-based goals as long
as the translated goals achieve the same degree of emission limitation as the EPA performance standards.
This paper evaluates the economic implications of performance standard regulations using production analy-
sis. In particular, we analyze optimal profits of decision making units (DMUs) taking into account potential
productive inefficiencies. Previous studies which analyze the efficiency of DMUs in the presence of envi-
ronmental regulation can be divided into two different strings of literature.2 The first string of literature
evaluates the technical efficiency of DMUs in the presence of regulation using distance functions. For exam-
ple, Ramli et al. (2013) modify and apply the directional distance function by Chung et al. (1997) to analyze
the eco-efficiency of the Malaysian manufacturing sector taking into account CO2 emissions, while Zofio and
Prieto (2001) apply the hyperbolic distance function by Fa¨re et al. (1989) to measure the effects of CO2
regulations on OECD countries.3 A second string of literature analyzes the economic (e.g. cost or profit)
efficiency of DMUs in the presence of environmental regulation taking into account price data. For example,
Bra¨nnlund et al. (1995) present an analysis of the profit efficiency in the Swedish pulp and paper industry
given a fixed quota on the emission of biological oxygen demand and chlorinated compounds. The profit
effects of tradable quotas are examined e.g. in Bra¨nnlund et al. (1998) and Nielsen (2012). An analysis of
profit efficiency in the presence of a tradable quota on CO2 emissions is presented in Oude Lansink and van
der Vlist (2008). Note that all aforementioned studies use nonparametric methods to evaluate the economic
effects of environmental regulation. For a more detailed and broader survey accounting e.g. for parametric
approaches see Ambec and Barla (2006).
In contrast to the previous literature we do not analyze the effect of a fixed or tradable quota (e.g. an absolute
upper boundary on total emissions) but the effects of emission standards (e.g. the ratio of the produced good
output to pollution). Although our approach is general and thus applicable to a wide range of environmental
policy cases, the paper and its empirical case are motivated by EPA’s recent proposal. Our modelling strategy
builds on Rødseth and Romstad (2014). We assume that the DMUs under consideration (the electricity
generating units) maximize profits and apply microeconomic production models to estimate maximal profits
with and without environmental regulation. We consider environmental performance standards that either
are DMU-specific or implemented for a group of DMUs (e.g., all DMUs belonging to an electric utility),
1 See https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/06/18/2014-13726/carbon-pollution-emission-guidelines-
for-existing-stationary-sources-electric-utility-generating#h-9 for details.
2 See Song et al. (2012) for a detailed review of the literature on nonparametric analysis of environmental efficiency.
3 Zhang and Choi (2014) provide a survey on the use of directional distance functions in environmental efficiency analysis.
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where the group-averaging approach builds on the model by Bra¨nnlund et al. (1998). By comparing the
different profit maxima, we are able to identify the economic gains from averaging emission intensities across
DMUs.
Our approach also allows examining changes in pollution between the three scenarios, i.e. profit maximiza-
tion in the cases i) without environmental regulation, ii) with DMU-specific performance standards, and
iii) with averaging of emission intensities across groups of DMUs. In the case of the EPA standards, the
resulting CO2 emissions when emission intensities are averaged across electricity generating units provide
valuable information for state plan designers. First, it will allow them to identify the DMU-specific per-
formance standards that together minimize the profit losses related to the implementation of a certain
state-specific standard. Second, knowledge about the level of regulatory induced emission reductions is
also important for converting EPA’s performance standards into mass-based goals that achieve comparable
emission reductions.
It has long been recognized that different types of environmental policy instruments may affect the rates
and direction of technological change differently (Jaffe et al. 2002). The strand of literature which argues
that performance standards reduce incentives to invest in “clean” technologies (see e.g. Mohr 2006) is
particularly relevant to our case. However, our paper examines a different aspect of performance standards,
namely their potential to spur efficiency improvements given the state of the technology. Our approach builds
on microeconomic production analysis, and consequently offers the possibility to examine forgone profits
and excess pollution due to productive inefficiency. This is beneficial for at least three reasons. First, the
analysis describes the potential for performance standards to induce efficiency improvements for affected
DMUs. Second, the analysis allows identifying profit loss minimizing performance standards for affected
DMUs under the assumption that all units have adopted best practices, rather than calculating optimal
performance standards based on their current emission rates. In the latter case, the scope for reducing
pollution may be largely underestimated. Third, by also identifying economic losses due to inefficiency, our
approach may reveal that profit losses from environmental regulation - when compared to current profits
- may be low. If the measures that are implemented influence the DMUs to become more efficient, the
economic gains from efficiency improvements can partly or fully crowd out economic losses resulting from
environmental compliance. Furthermore, our approach allows for net benefits of the environmental regulation
by accounting for the possibility that the profits under the regulation exceed the actual business-as-usual
profits due to the adaption of best-practices. Empirical evidence of net benefits would be supportive of the
so-called Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde 1995).
We illustrate our approach with an empirical example from the U.S. power sector. Rather than providing
a complete assessment for all electricity generating units belonging to a state or several states, covering a
wide range of fuel types, we emphasize CO2 performance standards for bituminous-fired generating units.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), bituminous coal generates on average
2,236.8 kilograms of CO2 per short ton, and is therefore among the most CO2-intensive fuels. Hence, the
implementation of CO2 standards will therefore strongly affect the bituminous coal using generating units.
Our sample selection strategy also ensures the homogeneity of the units under consideration to a much
larger degree than most comparable studies.
We analyze the economic implications of performance standards for a sample of 144 bituminous-fired gen-
erating units that were in operation in 2011 using a modification of the nonparametric Free Disposable Hull
(FDH) model by Deprins et al. (1984). Moreover, we evaluate benefits from averaging emission intensities
across multiple electricity generating units. Therefore, we propose a new methodological approach which
is similar to the idea of a central planner which optimally divides resources (see Nasrabadi et al. 2012) or
costs and revenues (see Khodabakhshi and Aryavash 2014) among subunits. Our analysis is comparable to
other studies which use production analysis techniques to analyze the economic benefits of emission trading
(see Bra¨nnlund et al. 1998, Fa¨re et al. 2013b, and Fa¨re et al. 2014). However, while the mentioned studies
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emphasize emission trading, our paper is, to our knowledge, the first to present a detailed treatment on
analyzing benefits from emission intensity averaging under a performance standard regime.
Our results show that the generating units under consideration are profit inefficient, and could potentially
increase their combined profits by 27.5 percent in the case of no CO2 regulation. Performance standards
higher or equal to 1.03 tons of CO2 per Megawatt-hour are found not to lead to profit losses given the
adoption of best practices, while standards below 0.85 tons per Megawatt-hour lead to a complete shutdown
of the bituminous electricity generating units. We find that a state-wise electric utility-specific averaging of
emission intensities reduces profit losses relative to uniform generating unit-specific performance standards,
but at the expense of increased CO2 emissions.
4 Moreover, we find that profit efficiency improvements
can allow the units to experience net economic gains for some performance standards, but possibly at the
expense of increased CO2 emissions compared to current emissions.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our methodological approach to optimal profits.
Section 3 presents the analysis of optimal profits for U.S. coal-fired power plants, while section 4 concludes
the paper.
2 Theory
In this section we present the methodological background of our analysis. We start by discussing the defini-
tion and estimation of environmental production technologies. Building upon the theoretical concepts, we
present nonparametric methods to calculate optimal profits and propose a new approach to evaluate flexible
performance standards based on the averaging of emission intensities.
2.1 Modeling and estimating environmental technologies
In our empirical analysis we consider the optimal short-run profits for coal-fired power plants in the United
States. The electricity generation is modeled as a production process in which a single polluting input
(bituminous coal) and a single non-polluting input (capacity) are used to produce a single good output
(electricity) and a single bad output (CO2).
5 This specification of the electricity generating process follows
previous studies on the efficiency of U.S. power plants, see e.g. Mekaroonreung and Johnson (2012) and
Hampf and Rødseth (2015). Defining xP ∈ R+ as the polluting input, xNP ∈ R+ as the non-polluting input
and y ∈ R+ as the good output, the conventional technology which does not account for the production of
emissions comprises all technically feasible combinations of inputs and good outputs and reads as:
TConv =
{(
xP , xNP , y
)
∈ R3+ :
(
xP , xNP
)
can produce y
}
. (2.1)
From the definition of the technology it is obvious that, when derived from empirical data, all observations
belong to the technology since their input-output combinations are observed and, thus, technically feasible.
To construct a technology set based on empirical observations which satisfies several economically and
technically reasonable characteristics (e.g. inactivity) specific axioms have to be imposed on the technology.
For conventional technologies, a neoclassical axiomatic system has been proposed by Shephard (1970). These
axioms are (see Fa¨re and Primont (1995) for a detailed discussion):
1. Inactivity: (0, 0, 0) ∈ TConv.
It is possible to shut down operations.
4 In our analysis we refer to each generator located at coal-fired plants as a generating unit. Electric utilities are the
companies which own the plants and may therefore be owning and operating multiple generating units.
5 Note that our theoretical discussion can be easily extended to the case of more than two inputs and two outputs. For
the sake of notational simplicity we restrict this presentation to our empirical specification.
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2. No free-lunch: (0, 0, y) /∈ TConv if y > 0.
It is not possible to produce positive amounts of good outputs without using any inputs.
3. Strong disposability of inputs:
If
(
xP , xNP , y
)
∈ TConv then
(
x˜P ≥ xP , x˜NP ≥ xNP , y
)
∈ TConv.
It is always possible to produce the same amount of output using more inputs.
4. Strong disposability of good outputs:
If
(
xP , xNP , y
)
∈ TConv then
(
xP , xNP , y˜ ≤ y
)
∈ TConv.
It is always possible to produce less output for a given input mix.
5. Closeness: TConv is a closed set.
The boundary of the technology is thus also part of the technology.
In addition to inputs and good outputs, environmental technologies also account for the unintended by-
production of bad outputs (in our application CO2). Defining b ∈ R+ as the bad output, the environmental
technology reads as:
TEnv =
{(
xP , xNP , y, b
)
∈ R4+ :
(
xP , xNP
)
can produce (y, b)
}
. (2.2)
In contrast to conventional technologies, the axioms by Shephard (1970) cannot readily be imposed on
environmental technologies since it would lead to physically infeasible technology sets (Fa¨re and Grosskopf
2003). For example, assuming free disposability of bad outputs would imply that all DMUs can reduce their
emissions to zero at no costs (Førsund 2009). To overcome this issue various alternative axiomatic systems
have been proposed (see Scheel (2001) for an overview). In most empirical analyses the joint production
(JP) or weak disposability model by Fa¨re et al. (1989) is applied (see e.g. Zhou et al. (2008) for a survey on
empirical environmental efficiency studies). Fa¨re et al. (1989) proposed two additional axioms for modeling
environmental technology sets: weak disposability and null-jointness of good and bad outputs (for a more
thorough discussion of these axioms see Fa¨re and Grosskopf 2004).
JP.1 Weak disposability of bad outputs:
If
(
xP , xNP , y, b
)
∈ TEnv, then
(
xP , xNP , θy, θb
)
∈ TEnv with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Bad outputs can only be reduced if the good ouputs are reduced by the same proportion. Therefore,
the reduction of bad outputs is costly (in terms of reduced good outputs).
JP.2 Null-jointness: If
(
xP , xNP , y, b
)
∈ TEnv and b = 0, then y = 0.
It is not possible to produce positive amounts of the good output without producing positive amounts
of the bad output.
An alternative approach to modeling environmental technologies has been introduced by Rødseth (2014)
which is based on the materials balance (MB) condition. The MB, introduced in the economic literature
by Ayers and Kneese (1969), states that the amount of materials bound in polluting inputs is equal to the
amount of materials bound in good and bad outputs. That is, materials can not vanish during the production
process (see Lauwers (2009) for a justification of applying the MB in economic models). Rødseth (2014)
proposes an axiomatic approach to environmental technologies which explicitly accounts for the restrictions
imposed by the MB.
MB.1 Weak g-disposability:
If
(
xP , xNP , y, b
)
∈ TEnv and sxgx + sygy = gb, then
(
xP + gx, x
NP , y − gy, b+ gb
)
∈ TEnv.
For a given input-output combination within T only changes which are in line with the MB are valid
to remain within T .
MB.2 Output essentiality:
If
(
xP , xNP , y, b
)
∈ TEnv and b = 0, then xP = 0.
It is not possible to produce zero bad outputs given positive amounts of the polluting input.
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In the weak g-disposability axiom (MB.1) gx, gy, and gb represent changes in the inputs, the good output,
and the bad output, respectively, when inputs and outputs are disposed. Choosing the gx, gy, and gb (e.g.,
by allowing them to be determined ex ante by the researcher or, as in this paper, by allowing the empirical
production model to endogenously determine them) is equivalent to choosing the direction in which inputs
and outputs are disposable (also known as the G-direction). The summary constraint sxgx + sygy = gb
restricts the direction in which inputs and outputs are disposable. Let sx and sy represent the exogenous
emission factor for the polluting input and the recuperation factor for the good output.6 Then the weak G-
disposable enforces disposal in line with the materials balance principle, ensuring that changes in emissions
gb equal the sum of changes in emissions due to disposal of the inputs (sxgx) and the good output (sygy).
In our example of the electricity generation, sy = 0 because the output electricity does not contain any
materials. For a more detailed comparison of the JP and the MB model, as well as an empirical application,
see Hampf and Rødseth (2015).
To estimate the technology sets from empirical data we use nonparametric frontier methods. In contrast
to parametric methods (e.g. Stochastic Frontier Analysis), the nonparametric approach does not assume a
specific functional form of the production function enveloping the technology or impose assumptions on the
inefficiency distribution. Moreover, it is not restricted to a single output.7 Given a sample of i = 1, . . . , n
decision making units (DMUs) the nonparametric estimation of the JP model reads as:
TJP =
{(
xP , xNP , y, b
)
∈ R4+ : xNP ≥
n∑
i=1
xNPi λi, x
P ≥
n∑
i=1
xPi λi, y ≤
n∑
i=1
yiλiθ,
b =
n∑
i=1
biλiθ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,
n∑
i=1
λi = 1, λ1, . . . , λn ∈ {0, 1}
}
.
(2.3)
In this formulation xNPi (x
P
i , yi, bi) refers to the amount of non-polluting inputs (polluting inputs, good
outputs, bad outputs) of DMU i, with the inequalities for the inputs and the good output indicating strong
disposability while the equality on b implies weak disposability.8 θ denotes the weak disposability factor to
be endogenously determined for each DMU. λi represents the weighting factor of DMU i. The summing-up
condition on the λ-factors, as well as restricting them to be either equal to zero or equal to one, implies
the non-convexity of the technology. Therefore, our approach to the technology estimation is an adaption of
the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) estimator by Deprins et al. (1984) to an analysis including weak disposable
outputs. We use this model since the test of convexity by Simar and Wilson (2011) rejects the hypothesis
of a convex technology set (p-value: 0.053).9
The nonparametric estimation of the MB model reads as:
TMB =
{(
xP , xNP , y, b
)
∈ R4+ : xNP ≥
n∑
i=1
xNPi λi, x
P =
n∑
i=1
xPi λi + x,
y =
n∑
i=1
yiλi − y, b =
n∑
i=1
biλi + b,
sxx + syy = b,
n∑
i=1
λi = 1,
λ1, . . . , λn ∈ {0, 1}, x, y, b ≥ 0
}
.
(2.4)
In addition to the variables defined above, x, y and b refer to the slacks in the inputs and outputs which
have to satisfy the materials balance condition.
6 Emission (recuperation) factors indicate the amount of materials bound in one unit of inputs (outputs).
7 See e.g. Greene (2008) for a discussion on issues with parametric models containing multiple outputs.
8 A formal proof of that the equality constraint implies weak disposability of the technology can be found in Fa¨re and
Grosskopf (2004, p. 49-51).
9 See Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2004) and Hampf and Rødseth (2015) for discussions on convex, variable returns to scale versions
of the production models.
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The presented estimations of the technology sets are non-convex versions of the estimators presented in
Fa¨re et al. (1989) and Hampf and Rødseth (2015). However, when estimated from empirical observations
these technology estimates do not necessarily satisfy axiom 1 (inactivity).10 To allow for the inactivity
of the generating units, which implies the possibility to shut down operations, the dataset needs to be
modified. Inactivity is particularly important in our application since firms will not continue to operate
generators if they cannot cover their variable costs. Following Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1995) we add
a zero observation, an artificial observation with
(
xP0 , x
NP
0 , y0, b0
)
= (0, 0, 0, 0), to the dataset to allow for
inactivity.
2.2 Estimating optimal profits
Based on the nonparametric estimation of the technology sets we calculate the optimal profits for the DMUs
which in our application correspond to the electricity generating units (see e.g. Thanassoulis et al. (2008) for
a discussion on profit maximization subject to nonparametric technology estimation). We assume that the
DMUs maximize their short-run profits by considering the non-polluting input (capacity as a proxy for the
capital stock) as fixed.11 Furthermore, we assume that the profit optimization is restricted by an exogenously
given constraint on the maximal ratio of bad to good outputs (the performance standard(s)). For example,
such a regulation is given by EPA’s initial proposal for carbon dioxide standards which restricts the maximal
emission intensity to 1000 pounds of CO2 per MWh of produced electricity, as well as the recently proposed
state-specific standards.
In this setting both axiomatic approaches (the joint production and the materials balance model) lead to the
same results.12 A proof of this equivalence and a derivation of the following binary programming problems
can be found in the appendix. The unconstrained short-run profit optimization problem for DMU i reads
as:
max
λ1,...,λn
pi
∑n
j=1 yjλj − qi
∑n
j=1 x
P
j λj
s.t. xNPi ≥
∑n
j=1 x
NP
j λj∑n
j=1 λj = 1
λ1, . . . , λn ∈ {0, 1}.
(2.5)
This programming problem estimates the maximal profit of DMU i assuming that no environmental reg-
ulation is imposed. pi ∈ R+ denotes the exogenously given price for the good output (in our application
electricity) while qi ∈ R+ denotes the price for the polluting input (in our case bituminous coal). Note that
we allow the prices to differ among the DMUs.
Adding the regulatory constraint on the maximal feasible emission to output ratio (b/y ≤ s, where s is
predetermined) leads to the modified, restricted binary programming problem
max
λ1,...,λn
pi
∑n
j=1 yjλj − qi
∑n
j=1 x
P
j λj
s.t. xNPi ≥
∑n
j=1 x
NP
j λj∑n
j=1 bjλj − s
∑n
j=1 yjλj ≤ 0∑n
j=1 λj = 1
λ1, . . . , λn ∈ {0, 1}.
(2.6)
In this model we assume that each generating unit independently optimizes its profit subject to a fixed,
exogenous regulatory constraint. This constraint is the same for all DMUs located in the same state. Hence,
10 The estimated technologies only satisfy the inactivity axiom if an inactive unit is part of the dataset, which is rarely the
case given empirical data.
11 See Welch and Barnum (2009) for a similar methodological approach to a cost and environmental analysis of power
plants.
12 Moreover, due to an optimization approach which is not based on distance functions, the problems discussed by Chen
(2014) for the JP model do not arise.
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the EPA standard, which was discussed in the introduction, is implemented uniformly across all generating
units located in a state. To evaluate the benefits of a more flexible regulatory regime which allows the
utilities to average the emission to electricity ratio across their electricity generating units, we propose a
modified optimization approach. We assume that each utility simultaneously optimizes the profit for all its
generating units, subject to the constraint that the average ratio satisfies the given regulatory standard. For
example, this approach is in line with the NOx regulations under the Acid Rain Program. Moreover, in line
with the EPA’s recently proposed performance standards, we allow averaging emission intensities across the
generators located in the same state.
Therefore, the short-run profit is optimized given the constraint b¯/y¯ ≤ s where b¯ (y¯) denotes the average
emissions (average amount of produced electricity) of all DMUs belonging to a utility in a particular state.
Note that we use the ratio of averages
(
(1/n)
∑n
i=1 bi
(1/n)
∑n
i=1 yi
)
as the constraint for this aggregated optimization. This
is done to avoid infeasible solutions which would occur if the average ratio
(
(1/n)
∑n
i=1 bi/yi
)
is evaluated
and some of the generating units shut down operations (yi = bi = 0). Moreover, even if we account for
this problem by adding a non-archimedean constant to the denominator of the ratios, the average of ratios
can lead to problematic results since it favors corner solutions. Consider a utility with 4 efficient and
one (relatively) inefficient generating unit. If the inefficient unit has access to less costly coal it could be
economically optimal to use solely the inefficient unit under the constraint 15
(
bi
yi
)
≤ s. Hence, this approach
is likely to lead to environmental hotspots which should not be generated by regulatory actions (see e.g.
Gruenspecht and Lave (1989) for a discussion of this issue). In the light of these arguments we decided to
use the ratio of averages to quantify the economic benefits of emission intensity averaging.13
Assuming that the n DMUs can be attributed to l = 1, . . . , k utilities with nl denoting the number of DMUs
belonging to a utility in a given state, the optimization problem for the aggregated profit of a utility l in
this state reads as:
max
λ1,1,...,λn,nl
∑nl
z=1
(
pz
∑n
i=1 yiλi,z − qz
∑n
i=1 x
P
i λi,z
)
s.t. xNPlz ≥
∑n
i=1 x
NP
i λi,z
z = 1, . . . , nl∑ni=1 λi,z = 1
λ1,z , . . . , λn,z ∈ {0, 1}∑nl
z=1
(∑n
i=1 biλi,z − s
∑n
i=1 yiλi,z
) ≤ 0.
(2.7)
In this formulation, the objective function represents the sum of profits of all nl generating units belonging
to utility l. The first three restrictions model the technology constraints for the generating units. Note
that the reference DMUs and hence the λ-values may differ for all units. Hence, the optimization problem
contains n× nl λ-values.14 The last constraint restricts the ratio of average emissions to average electricity
not to be larger than the exogenous standard s. To obtain results for each of the n DMUs this programming
problem has to be solved for each of the k utilities and for each state. Note that if the averaging is allowed
across all n units of all k utilities in all states, our model collapses into a non-convex version of the model
by Bra¨nnlund et al. (1998).
To estimate the optimal profits based on equations (2.6) and (2.7) we use our own programmings for the
statistical software R. The programming problems are solved using the R package lpSolve by S. Buttrey.
The solver provided by this package uses a “‘branch-and-bound”-algorithm to solve integer programming
problems. For a more detailed description of the solver and the package see http://cran.r-project.org/
web/packages/lpSolve/lpSolve.pdf.
13 Note that if the ratio of averages is equal to c the average ratio can not be smaller than s since by Jensen’s inequality it
follows that E(b/y) = E(b) · E(1/y) ≥ E(b) · 1/E(y) = E(b)/E(y).
14 For more detailed discussions on network technologies modeling subunits see e.g. Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2000).
8 Benjamin Hampf, Kenneth Løvold Rødseth
In the following empirical analysis we evaluate and compare the optimal profits for different standards.
Moreover, the economic benefit of averaging emission intensities is compared to the environmental effects
as quantified by the aggregated emissions.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section we present the data and results of our analysis of U.S. power plants. We start by describing
the construction of the dataset, highlighting our strategy to ensure that the generating units under consid-
eration are homogeneous. This description is followed by a presentation and discussion of the results for the
profit optimizations. We present results on the effects of emission intensity averaging evaluating a grid of
exogenously given performance standards, as well as for specific standards proposed by the EPA.
3.1 Constructing the dataset
As explained in the theory section, we model a production process assuming that the electricity generating
units use two inputs (fuel and capacity) to produce a single good (electricity) and a single bad (carbon
dioxide) output. The short-run costs of the units are given by their fuel consumption times the fuel price
while their revenues consist of the produced electricity times the price of electricity. We define the differences
in the units’ revenues and the short-run costs as their short-run profits.15 The selection of the analyzed units
is based on the file EIA-860 by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) which provides data on
the input variable capacity. Data on the fuel input, the electricity generation as well as the CO2 emissions
are collected from the Clean Air Markets database provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Finally, data on fuel prices are obtained from file EIA-923, while data on sales prices for electricity
are obtained from file EIA-861. Following Fa¨re et al. (2005), the sales price is equal to the average of the
retail and resale prices for electricity. Our sample covers generating units which were in operation during
2011.
Following Mekaroonreung and Johnson (2012) we restrict our sample to those generating units that only
use bituminous coal (measured in million british thermal units, MMBtu). With this selection criterion we
assure that the generating units are evaluated against a reference set which only contains units operating
under the same technological conditions. In contrast, previous studies (see e.g. Fa¨re et al. 2007) which
include generating units that use different coal types and moreover additional fuel types (e.g. oil, natural
gas) are likely to lead to efficiency estimates which are biased, since they capture efficiency differences as
well as technological differences among the generating units.16 In our analysis we assume that the fuel
consumption is a variable input. Hence, it is endogenously determined by profit maximization. As a second
input we include the capacity of the generating units (measured in megawatts) as a proxy of their capital
stock. We use a proxy variable since studies which estimate the capital stock directly by using data from
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) are faced with significant reductions in the number of
observations leading to results which are questionable in terms of their generalizability (see e.g. Hampf (2014)
for such an analysis with a limited number of observations). For the same reason we do not include labor in
our analysis.17 However, Welch and Barnum (2009) argue that the labor input of a plant is proportional to
its generating capacity. Therefore, by including the capacity of the plants we indirectly account for the labor
15 Note that in line with the literature on profit efficiency we assume that the prices are not affected by the profit op-
timization. If demand and supply functions are known, endogenous models (see Johnson and Ruggiero 2011) could be
estimated.
16 See Heshmati et al. (2012) for a discussion of the issues when estimating power plant efficiency with heterogeneous
technology sets.
17 See Fa¨re et al. (2013a) for a discussion on the reduction of the number of observations due to missing data from U.S.
power plants.
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input. In our analysis we assume that the capacity and hence the capital stock is fixed in the short run.
Hence, the capacity of the generating units is an exogenous variable. In addition to the inputs, we include the
good output electricity (measured in megawatt hours, MWh) and the bad output carbon dioxide (measured
in tons), which are assumed to be variable and hence endogenously determined factors.
The total sample comprises 160 generating units operating in the United States in 2011.18 From this sample
we have to remove 16 observations due to missing data on the fuel or electricity prices. Hence, the final
analyzed sample contains 144 generating units (excluding the artificial “zero observation”). These units can
be attributed to 29 utilities as well as to 15 states where the plants are located. Descriptive statistics of the
analyzed sample are presented in table 1.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the data (144 units)
Variable Min. Mean Max. St.dev.
Capacity (MW) 112.50 345.42 1425.60 233.31
Fuel (MMBtu) 57417.69 16570772.62 74900000.00 14829299.04
Electricity (MWh) 5884.10 1754698.85 8541295.90 1632501.37
CO2 (tons) 5890.97 1702688.82 7686116.00 1521278.43
Electricity price ($ per MWh) 42.12 68.40 99.67 10.03
Fuel price ($ per MMBtu) 1.50 3.16 5.19 0.74
3.2 Aggregated results for the generating units
The aggregated results for the total sample of 144 generating units are depicted in figure 1 which consists
of two panels. The upper panel presents the sum of optimal profits of all generating units (in billion dollars)
calculated using programming problems (2.6) and (2.7) for a grid of emission standards ranging from 0.8
to 1.25 tons of CO2 per MWh of produced electricity.
19 The maximal observed emission intensity in the
sample is 1.23 tons per MWh. Therefore, standards larger than 1.23 tons per MWh are equal to a situation
without any standards since the restriction on the emission intensity is not binding for any of the evaluated
generating units. In contrast, the minimal observed emission intensity in the sample is 0.85 tons per MWh.
Hence, imposing a standard lower than 0.85 tons per MWh leads to a shutdown of all units in the sample.
Thus, the effective interval of the performance standards is given by [0.85, 1.23] tons per MWh.
The solid line in the upper panel of figure 1 indicates the optimal profits for different performance standards
if they are fixed for each generating unit, hence if the optimal profit for each generator cannot be associated
with an emission intensity larger than the imposed standards. The dashed line indicates the optimal profits if
intensity averaging is allowed. In this setting the ratio of average emissions to average produced electricity of
all generating units owned by a utility in a state has to be lower than or equal to the defined standard. Finally,
the horizontal dotted line represents the actual (or business-as-usual) short-run profits of the generating
units, which amount to 10.46 billion dollars.20 Note that to be able to generate this figure we have assumed
that each state implements the same standard. If standards differ across the states, the optimal profits will
change. However, since we assume that utilities cannot average the intensities across states, the benefits of
the averaging will not be biased in this situation.
From the figure it is obvious that without regulation (or with a standard larger than 1.23 tons per MWh)
considerable potentials to increase profits exist. The maximal aggregated profit in this setting amounts to
13.31 billion dollars. Therefore, the profit efficiency is equal to (13.31/10.46)× 100% = 127.25% indicating
18 See Hampf and Rødseth (2015) for more details on the data.
19 Note that the grid is evaluated for steps of 0.01 tons per MWh.
20 We define the profits of the generating units given their inefficiencies as the business-as-usual profits.
10 Benjamin Hampf, Kenneth Løvold Rødseth
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Aggregated optimal profits
Emission standard
To
ta
l p
ro
fit
 (in
 bi
llio
n d
oll
ars
)
0.80 0.84 0.88 0.92 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12 1.16 1.20 1.24
Uniform standard
Intensity averaging
Actual profit
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
Profit gains from intensity averaging
Emission standard
Pr
of
it 
di
ffe
re
n
ce
 to
 u
ni
fo
rm
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
(in
 bi
llio
n d
oll
ars
)
0.80 0.84 0.88 0.92 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12 1.16 1.20 1.24
Fig. 1 Aggregated results of the profit maximization
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that the generating units’ combined profits could be increased by 27.25% if best practices would be adopted
and efficiency improvement potential would be exploited.
The results for standards below 1.23 tons per MWh show that the introduction of the environmental
regulation does not necessarily lead to profit reductions if efficiency improvements are taken into account.
By adopting best practices the generating units can decrease their emission intensity and thus are able to
maintain a profit very close to the optimal profits down to a standard of 1.03 tons per MWh if a uniform
standard is imposed. In case of a regulation which allows for averaging among generating units, these profits
can be obtained even for standards smaller than 1.03 tons per MWh. The dashed line indicates only small
changes down to standards of 0.93 tons per MWh. If the standards are further reduced, the optimal profits
start to decline even if efficiency improvements are exploited. The intersections of the profit curves with the
dotted line indicate the standard which is associated with an optimal profit that is equal to the business-
as-usual profits without any regulation. The figure shows that if a fixed standard is imposed a restriction of
approximately 0.91 tons per MWh would lead to this equality of profits while the averaging approach leads
to an intersection for a lower standard of approximately 0.88 tons per MWh. This highlights the possibility
to obtain larger profits if the utilities are allowed to average emission intensities.
To visualize in more detail the additional profits due to emission averaging, the lower panel in figure
1 presents the differences in maximal profits between the averaging approach compared to the uniform
standard, hence depicts
∑k
l=1
(
pil,avg − pil,unif
)
s
≥ 0, where pil,avg denotes the profit of utility l given the
possibility to average intensities while pil,unif represents the profit under a uniform standard. s denotes the
analyzed standard. Similar to the upper panel, this figure shows that due to the adaption of best-practices
there are profit decreases close to zero caused by the regulation and hence nearly no profit gains from the
intensity averaging for standards larger than 1.03 tons per MWh. For standards smaller than 1.03 tons per
MWh the averaging approach leads to additional profits compared to the uniform standard with a maximal
gain for a standard of 0.87 tons per MWh. Given this standard the averaging leads to additional profits of 2.7
billion dollars. Stated differently, the averaging approach leads to additional profits of approximately 26%
of the business-as-usual profits of 10.46 billion dollars. These numbers show that large economic benefits
can be obtained when allowing utilities to average their emission intensities.
In order to analyze the sensitivity of our results we have calculated the optimal profits for three alternative
model specifications. Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients comparing the results of the above specified
model with those obtained from an analysis allowing for convexity (Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA) given
two different assumptions regarding the returns to scale (constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns
to scale (VRS)). The results show that the optimal profits for uniform standards and intensity averaging
as well as the profit gains from intensity averaging are highly correlated with the results obtained in our
specification. However, the results for an analysis of a non-convex (FDH) model excluding the capacity
variable (as proposed by Welch and Barnum (2009)) show that the profit gains from intensity averaging are
only weakly correlated to those obtained from our model. This follows because in the alternative model all
inputs and outputs are variable and therefore the benefits from the more flexible emission intensity averaging
approach decrease. However, by removing the capacity as a variable in the model it is implicitly assumed
that the size of the plants can be changed instantaneously without any costs. Since this assumption is rather
implausible our chosen model specification represents a more realistic view on the potential benefits from
emission averaging.
Table 2 Results of the sensitivity analysis (optimal profits)
Uniform standard Intensity averaging Profit gains
DEA (CRS) 0.9993 0.9993 0.9180
DEA (VRS) 0.9993 0.9975 0.9062
FDH (excl. capacity) 0.9042 0.9042 0.1600
Note: The table presents the Spearman rank correlation coefficients.
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Comparing the aggregate CO2 emissions for different standards, we find a trade-off between the economic
benefits and the environmental damages of the two regulatory approaches. Figure 2 depicts the aggregated
carbon dioxide emissions (in million tons) for different standards given the profit optimization of the gener-
ating units. The two different curves indicate the emissions associated with the uniform standard and the
averaging approach, while the horizontal dotted line indicates the aggregate CO2 emissions resulting in the
(non-optimized) business-as-usual production situation. In addition, the horizontal dotdashed line repre-
sents the amount of emissions resulting if the actual emissions are reduced by 30%. This emission reduction
is expected to result from the implementation of the regulatory plans of the EPA for the coal-fired power
plants in the United States as presented in the introduction.
The emission curves in this figure show very similar patterns to the profit curves in the upper panel of figure
1. Therefore, the additional profits resulting from both the adoption of best practices and the possibility
to average emission intensities are associated with an increase in the total emissions. Hence, our results
indicate a trade-off between the environmental damages and the economic benefits from profit optimization
as well as intensity averaging. Furthermore, the figure highlights that the implementation of standards
may not lead to lower, but higher emissions if the generating units react to the regulation by adopting
best practices. In such a situation very tight standards of 0.92 (0.89) tons per MWh in case of a fixed
(averaging) standard would have to be imposed to be able to maintain the current emission level, given that
the electricity generating units reduce their inefficiencies. Moreover, to achieve the reduction projections of
the EPA even more restrictive standards of 0.88 (0.87) tons per MWh have to be imposed if the DMUs
exploit their efficiency enhancements possibilities.
The discussion of efficiency effects induced by the implementation of a regulation connects our analysis
to the economic discussion on potential positive effects of regulation for the regulated firms known in the
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literature as the “Porter-Hypothesis” based on Porter and van der Linde (1995). This hypothesis states that
flexible environmental regulations can have positive economic implications for firms if the economic gains
by activities required to satisfy the regulations (e.g. by investing in new production methods which reduce
resource usage and therefore pollution) offset the costs associated with the regulation (e.g. the payment
for emission taxes). In our application the implementation of performance standards could encourage the
utilities to increase their efficiency by adopting best-practices to achieve lower emission intensities and hence
increase their profits. However, although the emission intensities may improve, our results also suggest that
the overall emissions can increase compared to the ex-ante emissions.
3.3 Distributive effects
In the following we present the distributive effects of this regulation. That is, we examine how many utilities
will suffer decreases in their profits (pil,s) compared to their business-as-usual profits (pil,act) and whether
these decreases are offset by utilities which obtain larger profits due to efficiency improvements. Therefore,
we divide for each standard s ∈ [0.8, 1.25] the k = 29 utilities of our sample into two groups: Ws ={
l|pil,s − pil,act ≥ 0
}
and Ls =
{
l|pil,s − pil,act < 0
}
. The group Ws denotes all “winners” for the standard s
and contains all firms which do not suffer losses compared to their actual profits if they adopt the best-
practice under the regulatory standard s. Firms which face decreased profits under this regulation, and
hence can be considered as the “losers” of the regulation, are collected in the set Ls. Moreover, we define
piW,s =
∑
l∈Ws
(
pil,s − pil,act
) ≥ 0 (3.1)
piL,s =
∑
l∈Ls
(
pil,s − pil,act
)
< 0 (3.2)
as the total wins and losses due to the regulatory standard s. Note that the wins and losses are defined
relative to the (non-optimized) actual profits. Negative short-run profits
(
pil,s < 0
)
are not possible in our
model since inactivity
(
pil,s = 0
)
is always a feasible option.
Based on these wins and losses we define the loser share as the number of utilities with losses due to the
regulation s divided by the total number of utilities in our sample (29). Furthermore, we define a profit
index Is as:
Is =
piW,s
piW,s + |piL,s|
=
2piW,s
2
(
piW,s + |piL,s|
) = piW,s + |piL,s|
2
(
piW,s + |piL,s|
) + piW,s − |piL,s|
2
(
piW,s + |piL,s|
)
=
1
2
+
1
2
· piW,s − |piL,s|(
piW,s + |piL,s|
)
(3.3)
where piW,s−|piL,s| can be interpreted as the net profit effect of the regulatory standard s with piW,s−|piL,s| <
0 (> 0) indicating a net loss (win) compared to the current profit level. This index is bound in the interval
[0, 1] and takes the value 0 if all firms loose due to the regulation
(
piW,s = 0
)
and the value 1 if all firms
achieve profit gains compared to their business-as-usual profits
(
piL,s = 0
)
. Moreover, a value of 0.5 indicates
that the profit gains of the “winners” are equally large as the profit losses of the “losers”. An additional
interpretation of the index can be derived by calculating:
Is
1− Is =
piW,s
piW,s + |piL,s| ·
(
1− piW,s
piW,s + |piL,s|
)−1
=
piW,s
piW,s + |piL,s| ·
( |piL,s|
piW,s + |piL,s|
)−1
=
piW,s
|piL,s| .
(3.4)
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Hence, Is/(1− Is) · 100% indicates how much of the losses of the loosing utilities are gained by the winning
utilities with values larger (lower) than 100% indicating net wins (losses) of the regulation.
Figure 3 depicts the loser share (solid line) and the profit index Is for each s ∈ [0.8, 1.25]. The upper
panel presents the results assuming a uniform standard, while the lower panel presents the results given the
possibility to average emission intensities.
For the uniform standard, we find that the loser share is zero down to a standard of 1.19 tons per MWh. This
indicates that no utility will make smaller profits than its business-as-usual profit if efficiency improvement
potentials are exploited. Down to a standard of 0.94 tons per MWh this share increases only slightly to 14%.
Moreover, although some of the utilities suffer losses, the aggregated result is a net win of the regulation
with an Is value of 0.97 indicating that the winning firms gain 0.97/(1 − 0.97) · 100% = 3233.3% of the
losses. However, further tightening of the standard leads to a sharp increase in the loser share with 70% of
the utilities suffering losses compared to their current profits for a standard of 0.89 tons per MWh. For this
standard the Is is 0.17 which indicates that the winner only gain 20.5% of the losses experienced by the
losers. Hence, this fixed standard leads to net losses. Interestingly, the profit index and the loser share curves
cross at a value of 0.5. This indicates that if a standard is chosen which leads to the same number of utilities
winning from the regulation as the number of utilities loosing from the regulation, then the regulation also
leads to net losses of zero which means the aggregated business-as-usual profits can be maintained in this
situation.
The economic benefits from the intensity averaging approach are clearly visible from the lower panel of
figure 3. The loser share is 0% up to a standard of 1.11 tons per MWh indicating that compared to a
fixed standard tighter regulations can be imposed without leading to utility profits below the actual profits.
Moreover, the figure shows that the curves do not cross for a value of 0.5 for each curve. If the regulator
aims at implementing a standard which leads to the same number of winners and losers (sl = 0.5), the index
Is takes a value of 0.7. Therefore, for this standard the winners obtain larger profit gains than the losses of
the losers (233.3%) and hence this regulation would lead to net profits.
Furthermore, if a standard is implemented to achieve emission reductions of the EPA proposal (30% re-
duction of CO2 emissions) a standard of 0.88 tons per MWh has to be imposed given a uniform standard
if efficiency improvement potential are taken into account (see the discussion above) and of 0.87 tons per
MWh standard if emission intensity averaging is allowed. In case of a uniform standard this leads to a loser
share of nearly 90% and an Is of 0.08, indicating that a large net loss will occur due to this regulation.
In case of the possibility to average intensities, the loser share reduces to 82% and the index increases to
0.1. The difference in the Is values shows that although both regulations lead to net losses, the winners
can gain 11.1% of the losses given an averaging approach compared to only 8.7% if a fixed standard is
implemented. This shows that the reduction target can be achieved with smaller losses if the utilities are
allowed to average emission intensities.
3.4 Results for EPA standards
While the above discussed results are based on the evaluation of a grid of possible performance standards
which were assumed to be equal for all states, we now present the results for EPA’s state-specific standards.
These standards are calculated based on the output-weighted historical emission rates of different fossil
fuels, with the weights adjusted for future increase in natural gas, renewable, and nuclear power capacity, as
well as demand side energy reductions. The average EPA standard is 0.5 tons of CO2 per MWh produced,
which according to our previous results implies that all bituminous generating units in our sample would
shut down (see Kotchen and Mansur (2014) and Hampf and Rødseth (2015) for further evaluations of the
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technical feasibility of this standard for coal-fired generating units). Hence, we do consider the final EPA
standard to be an interesting case for our paper.21
The EPA standards are based on the so-called Best System of Emission Reduction, which involves consid-
ering a series of feasible measures for reducing carbon dioxide emission. One measure proposed by the EPA
is a 6% improvement in the emission intensities of the existing coal fleet, relative to their current emission
intensities. Our approach is well suited for evaluating the feasibility of this proposed efficiency improvement,
as well as its economic implications. Moreover, the EPA calculates separate performance standards for each
year between 2020 and 2030, under the assumption that the impact of renewable energy and demand-side
energy efficiency measures will increase over time. Since our dataset contains generating units in operation
in 2011 (i.e., long before the introduction of the renewables and demand-side improvements), it would be
more reasonable to evaluate the economic consequences of the EPA 2020 standard, than the implications of
its final standard in year 2030. By considering the EPA 2020 standard (a tight standard) and the standard
concerning 6% emission intensity improvements of current emission rates for coal (a lax standard), we are
readily able to evaluate the economic consequences of introducing performance standards of varying degrees
of stringency.
The state-specific results are presented in table 3. The mass-based goals as well as the net profit changes are
presented for both standards (EPA 6% target, EPA 2020 standard) and both approaches to performance
standards (uniform, averaging). The mass-based goals refer to state-specific emission targets calculated as
the sum of carbon dioxide pollution given the implementation of the EPA standards and our results for
the profit maximization. The net profits changes are calculated as the state-specific sum of optimal profits
minus the actual business-as-usual profits.
The difference in the stringency of the two EPA standards is clearly illustrated by table 3. Only three
states (Indiana, Kentucky, and West Virginia) have bituminous-fired units in operation if the EPA 2020
standard is uniformly implemented for all fuel types, while there are bituminous units in operation in all
states if the EPA 6% target is implemented. The 6% target appears to be unambitious for the coal fleet, as
our results indicate that profit maximization leads to profit losses in only two states (Colorado and Utah).
In contrast, all other states can achieve larger profits if the utilities exploit their efficiency enhancement
potentials. Moreover, only few states show significant differences in their profit changes if the utilities are
allowed to average emission intensities across their generating units compared to uniform standards. This
also indicates that the emission standards under the EPA 6% target are rather lax since utilities do not have
an incentive to reallocate production among their generating units to mininize compliance costs. However,
for states where utilities exploit averaging possibilities, we again find that the larger profits due to emission
intensity averaging are associated with an increase in aggregated emissions.
In contrast to the results for the EPA 6% target, the EPA 2020 standard results show that the strict standard
leads to substantially higher profit gains due to emission intensitiy averaging. This can be seen from the
results for Indiana and Kentucky, where Indiana’s profit losses due to the regulation drop from 542 million
to 395 million dollars while Kentucky’s profits gains increase from 119 million to 151 million dollars.
To show in more detail the different effects of the averaging approach for both standards, figure 4 presents
the density functions of emission intensities in the cases where an uniform standard is imposed and when
utilities can average emission intensities. The panel to the left illustrates the emission intensities under the
6-% coal efficiency standard, while the panel to the right illustrates the emission intensities under the EPA
2020 standard. It is obvious that the emission intensities under the 6-% coal efficiency standard do not differ
much across the two analyzed approaches. This result is caused by the fact that EPA’s proposed efficiency
improvement of 6% appears to be unambitious leading to ratios which are very similar to the ratios which
21 In principle, cost minimization implies allocating different standards to different fossil fuel types (that on average amount
to the EPA standards), in order to equalize marginal abatement costs across different fuel types. Hence, if the fuel-specific
abatement costs were known, it would be possible to assign fuel specific performance standards. The emission standard
for coal will intuitively be higher than the EPA standard.
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Fig. 4 Density functions of optimal emission intensities
result for optimal profits without any regulation (unconstrained optimization). The EPA 2020 standard is,
on the other hand, far more restrictive, which leads to a larger difference in the distribution of emission
intensities between the two approaches. This is intuitively reasonable, since by allowing for averaging, the
optimal emission intensities are distributed across the utility’s generating units such that their marginal
profit from a change in the standard are equalized. Thus, when the generating-units’ characteristics differ,
the optimal standards will also differ widely across the generating units.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a production analysis approach which allows examining economic implica-
tions of environmental performance standards. By applying a modification of the FDH production model
to a sample of 144 bituminous generating units, we have examined the economic implications of perfor-
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mance standards for CO2 emissions on bituminous-fired electricity generating units in the U.S. Our results
indicate that the economic consequences of CO2 performance standards may be severe, as standards below
0.85 tons of CO2 per MWh induce shut down of all units under consideration. However, for laxer standards
there is even a potential for achieving profit increases if the electricity generating units exploit the identi-
fied potential to improve their productive efficiency. We also find that profit improvements generally lead
to increases in CO2 emissions, which indicates that an important environmental-economic trade-off exists.
Moreover, our results for a regulatory regime that allows for averaging emission intensities among the gen-
erating units shows that considerably larger profits can be obtained compared to implementing uniform
standards. However, these additional profits are associated with larger overall emissions of CO2. Therefore,
our results capture well the pros and cons of performance standards as compared to mass-based emission
targets. Performance standards provide flexibility to accommodate changes in the overall quantities of elec-
tricity generated in response to shifts in electricity demand, while mass-based regulations make sure that
absolute emission reductions are achieved by the regulation. This result shows that when comparing uniform
standards to emission intensity averaging no unambiguously superior approach can be identified. If policy
makers want to reduce the profit losses caused by environmental regulation then intensity averaging is a
more suitable approach. However, if the reduction of emissions is the main objective without considering
profit losses then fixed standards lead to larger reductions of emissions compared to intensity averaging.
While our empirical results offer insights to the economic consequences of performance standards for CO2,
additional research is needed to guide the development of the state plans recently commissioned by the
EPA. We limit our analysis to generating units that only consume bituminous coal, and consequently leave
out possibilities to average emissions among different coal types and among coal and other fossil fuels. This
is an important consideration because these other fuel types differ in terms of their carbon intensities and
prices, hence involving important environmental-economic trade-offs that must be taken into account when
developing the state plans.
By focusing on only one fuel type, our paper differs widely from most other studies on the efficiency of
U.S. power plants. The common practice is to account for a wide range of different fuel types and qualities
in the production model, which we consider inconsistent with the goal of securing that the DMUs under
consideration are homogeneous and, thus, comparable. In other words, we believe that the common practice
leads to biased estimates. Future research may therefore model the overall energy supply using the fuel type-
specific technologies as presented in this paper, but allow emission intensity averaging across the fuel-specific
technologies using the network-technology approach of Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2000).
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Appendix
Proof of the equivalence of the JP and the MB model:
To start consider the profit optimization subject to the non-convex JP model:
max
y,xP ,b,λ1,...,λn
piy − qixP
s.t. xNPi ≥
∑n
j=1 x
NP
j λj
xP ≥ ∑nj=1 xPj λj
y ≤ ∑nj=1 yjλjθ
b =
∑n
j=1 bjλjθ
b− sy ≤ 0
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1∑n
j=1 λj = 1
λ1, . . . , λn ∈ {0, 1}.
(A.1)
In the optimum xP =
∑n
j=1 x
P
j λj and y =
∑n
j=1 yjλjθ hold since x
P and y can be freely chosen and
b =
∑n
j=1 bjλjθ by construction. Moreover, θ can be set equal to one since y and b can be freely chosen.
Replacing the modified equalities in the objective function and the regulatory constraint leads to:
max
λ1,...,λn
pi
∑n
j=1 yjλj − qi
∑n
j=1 x
P
j λj
s.t. xNPi ≥
∑n
j=1 x
NP
j λj∑n
j=1 bjλj − s
∑n
j=1 yjλj ≤ 0∑n
j=1 λj = 1
λ1, . . . , λn ∈ {0, 1}.
(A.2)
The optimization problem under the non-convex MB model is given by:
max
y,xP p,b,x,b,λ1,...,λn
piy − qixP
s.t. xNPi ≥
∑n
j=1 x
NP
j λj
xP =
∑n
j=1 x
N
j λj + x
y ≤∑nj=1 yjλj
b =
∑n
j=1 bjλj + b
sxx = b
b− sy ≤ 0
xP , y, b, x, b ≥ 0∑n
j=1 λj = 1
λ1, . . . , λn ∈ {0, 1}.
(A.3)
In this formulation the slack on the good output y is removed and the equality replaced by an inequality
since the output in our analysis (electricity) does not contain any materials. In the optimum x = b = 0 since
xP and b can be freely chosen. Hence, xP =
∑n
j=1 x
P
j λj and b =
∑n
j=1 bjλj . Moreover, y =
∑n
j=1 yjλj since
y can be freely chosen. Replacing these equalities in the objective function and the regulatory constraint
leads to:
max
λ1,...,λn
pi
∑n
j=1 yjλj − qi
∑n
j=1 x
P
j λj
s.t. xNPi ≥
∑n
j=1 x
NP
j λj∑n
j=1 bjλj − s
∑n
j=1 yjλj ≤ 0∑n
j=1 λj = 1
λ1, . . . , λn ∈ {0, 1}.
(A.4)
Therefore, the JP and the MB model lead to the same results for the profit maximization.
